TEHRAN did well by deciding to withdraw its military forces from Yemen and halt its support for the Houthi group. If this decision is true, Iran will be realigning its course and creating an opportunity for regional cooperation that could restore the country’s vitality. It will also open the door to restoring communication channels, not only with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) capitals but also with many other Arab countries. Since 1979, when the Iranian regime adopted the slogan of “exporting the revolution” and worked on establishing groups like Hezbollah in the Arab world, Tehran followed a trajectory that diverged from the hopes of Arab and Gulf nations.
From that moment onward, Iran abandoned its developmental ambitions, particularly those laid out since 1969, which sought to position the country as the factory of the Gulf and neighboring Asian countries, as well as a prime tourist and service destination, which reflected its status as a major regional power. There is no doubt that Iran holds major influence at various levels, provided it follows a path that does not conflict with the global community. However, the country’s vision has often been shaped by unrealistic goals stemming from a temporary revolutionary mindset, rather than a permanent approach. The Iranian regime has sought to prolong this revolutionary status, which contradicts the logical framework of a modern state, particularly when it is built on sectarian foundations in an environment that is culturally distinct from Iran’s own. Since the Battle of Dhi Qar and the defeat of the Sassanid Empire by the Arabs, Iranian nationalism has often been characterized by hostility toward its victorious neighbors. Thus, the relationship has always been subject to ebbs and flows.
Nevertheless, since the beginning of Islam, it has remained grounded in a spirit of cooperation. For most of history, the relationship was defined by a shared understanding that external threats to Islam required a unified response. This situation continued until the Iranian Revolution in 1979, which changed the equation and introduced a new hostility based on sectarian ideology, resulting in more harm than progress. Over the past four decades, the Iranian Revolution has sought to impose its will on the countries of the region. Terrorist operations in several Gulf states, particularly the Makkah bombings in the late 1980s, along with Iran’s targeting of some Gulf countries, have once again fueled divisions, seemingly reviving Sassanian nationalism.
This Iranian approach does not reflect true Islamic principles. Instead, it rekindles a sense of vengeance for the Battle of al- Qadisiyyah in 636 AD, a historical event that Iranian intellectuals often reference to justify the current regime’s position. This sentiment has reignited the conflict, now with the added dimension of inciting sectarian tensions at their worst. As a result, the region has had to approach its troublesome neighbor with considerable caution, especially given Tehran’s lack of positive response to the Gulf governments’ attempts to open a new chapter of good relations
To add salt to the injury, Iran has established terrorist cells in most Gulf countries and the Arab region. It is important to reiterate that Iran is a great country with the potential to play a pivotal role in the region. Iran could serve as a gateway for neighboring Asian countries, benefiting not only Gulf industries but also contributing to the establishment of a developmental economic axis akin to the Chinese Silk Road.
However, these achievements will remain out of reach unless Iran abandons its expansionist projects and stops threatening its neighbors. Today, Iran is grappling with a crippling international blockade, and its people are suffering from the worst crisis in the country’s history. The drums of war are echoing from the international community against Iran. It would be wise for Iran to open its doors for cooperation with all parties, rather than boasting about its control over four Arab capitals and turning these countries into failed states, as seen in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iraq. While these countries have begun to recover, they still have a long road ahead. The Iranian regime is mistaken if it believes that relying on political minorities, rather than just sectarian ones, will enable it to achieve such an ambitious program as changing societies’ cultures and the regimes of sovereign states. In Yemen, for instance, the Houthis, as a political entity, make up only about four percent of the total Yemeni forces.
Similarly, Lebanese Hezbollah constitutes no more than 15 percent of Lebanon’s forces. However, the reason for Hezbollah’s cancerous growth is the lack of serious efforts to limit weapons to the Lebanese army. Many have benefited from the continuation of this abnormal situation in Lebanon in one way or another. On the other hand, the irony is that mercenaries always lose everything in the end. This is what all those who sold themselves to the Iranian regime failed to realize, as if they had never read history or learned the lesson of figures like Abu Raghal, General Yaqoub, who betrayed the Egyptians in favor of the French campaign and collaborated with Napoleon, or the Abbasid Caliph Al-Musta’sim, who was killed by the Mongols under the feet of their horses. The fates of mercenaries have always been tragically cruel.
These examples of those who sold out their people and nations for a cheap profit confirm that Iran’s abandonment of the Houthis, its growing distance from Hezbollah, and its previous abandonment of Bashar al- Assad reveal a harsh reality - When a country no longer has use for its mercenaries, it discards them. Like an officer tossing a small bag of gold coins on the ground, forcing the mercenary to kneel and collect them, this scene represents the bitter humiliation of those once used as pawns, while the benefiting country saves itself by sacrificing its mercenaries.
