KUWAIT CITY, Feb 17: On Sunday, Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized a panel discussion titled “Decision Making: The Liberation of Kuwait” at the Saud Al-Nasser Al-Sabah Kuwaiti Diplomatic Institute. The discussion featured Dr. Richard Haass, Former Special Assistant to President George H.W. Bush from 1989 to 1993, and was moderated by Sheikh Nawaf Saud Al-Sabah, CEO of KPC.

During the session, Dr. Haass discussed the critical moments of the 1990 Iraq invasion of Kuwait and emphasized how the crisis became deeply personal for President George H.W. Bush. "In the early days of the crisis, Arab leaders urged the US to avoid overreacting, believing they could convince Saddam Hussein to withdraw. However, as diplomatic efforts failed, frustration grew within the Bush administration," Haass recalled.

He explained that his meeting with Kuwait’s Amir, Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, in late September 1990 helped reinforce the understanding that the situation was about more than international law or oil – it was about the survival of a country and its people. Haass noted, “Kuwait’s ambassador, Sheikh Saud Al-Nasser Al-Sabah, played a key role in making the situation personal for American leaders. Unlike the traditional, reserved diplomat, Sheikh Saud was emotional and direct, ensuring that US officials understood the human toll of Iraq’s occupation.”

Haass further shared that this visit added a new sense of urgency to US policy. "Bush began to see the situation in black-and-white terms – either Kuwait would be freed, or the aggression would be allowed to stand, with consequences for global order. This shift in mindset accelerated the path to military intervention," he said.

He also reflected on how history could have unfolded differently had another leader been in the White House. “Had someone else been president, the United States might have pursued a different approach—perhaps one of containment rather than liberation,” Haass stated. He highlighted that Kuwait’s efforts to humanize the crisis were crucial in securing the international coalition that led to the country’s liberation. “The combination of strong Kuwaiti advocacy and Bush’s unwavering stance ensured that the invasion of Kuwait would not be tolerated, setting a precedent for how the US would respond to future global conflicts,” he explained.

The discussion also touched on earlier moments in U.S. policy-making, particularly during the late 1960s when the Nixon administration first addressed concerns over Gulf security. Haass recalled a meeting in 1968 between then-President-elect Richard Nixon and Kuwait’s Amir Sheikh Sabah Al-Salim Al-Sabah, during which concerns about regional stability and Iraq’s potential threats to Kuwait were discussed.

At the time, the U.S. was deeply entrenched in the Vietnam War, and Gulf security was not a priority. “The Nixon Doctrine, developed in the late 1960s, was designed to shift the burden of regional defense to local allies, with the US providing arms rather than deploying troops,” Haass explained. However, as events unfolded, American engagement in the region evolved significantly.

Haass noted that his work on National Security Directive 26 under President George H.W. Bush expanded the U.S. commitment beyond external threats, incorporating concerns about internal instability within the Gulf States. “We were primarily concerned with Iran at the time,” Haass remarked. Iraq, he explained, was viewed as a potential partner rather than an imminent threat at that stage.

As tensions between Iraq and Kuwait escalated, Haass noted that Bush’s firm stance ultimately shaped the course of history. “By January 1991, a UN-backed coalition launched Operation Desert Storm, leading to the liberation of Kuwait in just over a month. In hindsight, officials say the moment Bush uttered those decisive words ‘this will not stand’ was the moment the course of action became inevitable,” Haass concluded.